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William James and His Individual Crisis 
 
I.  Introduction 
 
Students of William James have long commented on how critical periods of his 
life compelled crucial developments in his philosophical thought.  Ralph Barton Perry 
was the first to capitalize upon this recognition, with his examination of how James’s 
depression resulted in a very practical and highly personalized belief in the necessity of 
action as the only viable response to the Darwinian “process of the universe” (Perry 1:  
322).  Charlene Seigfried posits that, in addition to this seminal event, James likely faced 
two other crises.  In 1895, he turned from psychological studies to specifically 
philosophical issues (William James’s Radical Reconstruction 12).  In 1908-1909, these 
endeavors forced him to “give up ‘intellectualistic logic’” entirely and depend on a 
reconstructed “rational strand” in order to answer the old question (first posed in The 
Principles of Psychology) of how many consciousnesses can be at the same time one 
consciousness (13). 
Such insights have enriched and enlivened James studies, but the generalized 
conclusion they indicate—that James’s philosophy was an intensely lived but largely 
successful experience—deserves reevaluation.  The first part of this judgment is accurate; 
the second is far less so.  James’s first crisis was without doubt a lonely experience 
precipitated by questions of his responsibility to society and his place among others’ lives 
(Perry 1:  322).  That he emerged from his black night of the soul fairly unscathed and 
with a clear sense of his relationship to his world is not nearly as certain.  The acceptance 
of a teaching post a Harvard could not so easily resolve the questions he was asking.  
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I intend to show how James’s career defies more than it supports what might be 
called Perry’s “catastrophic” interpretation of his subject.  This is not to deny the strength 
of James’s feeling or the depth of his involvement in his own investigations.  Indeed, if a 
crisis may be said to last nearly thirty years, then James suffered a crisis of astounding 
proportions.  James’s thought, however, displays a remarkable continuity from 1870 
(when he first came to grips with his private, nihilistic demons) to near the end of the 
nineteenth century (when he began developing the implications of what would become 
pluralism and radical empiricism).  Throughout these years, James returned time and 
again to the same subjects of the individual, the value of individual action, and the 
possibility of individual agency in an evolutionary account of development.  This 
leitmotif is evident not only in the journal entries of 1870, but as well in his early 
publications, such as “The Sentiment of Rationality” (1879 and 1897) and “Great Men, 
Great Thoughts, and the Environment” (1880), and in the memorial address he delivered 
in 1897 to commemorate the actions of the first African-American combat regiment, the 
54th Massachusetts Infantry.    
A fair portion of James’s career, then, is bounded on the one end by individual 
questions such as those which led to his appointment at Harvard and on the other by 
questions of the individual such as those which (most famously) resulted in the 
publication of The Principles of Psychology.  Instead of signaling the end of a second 
crisis, the late nineteenth century appears to mark the end of a major phase through which 
one theme runs.  What at first glance seem to be two distinct events in James’s life—the 
depression which provoked his choice of a profession and the belated attraction to 
specifically philosophical issues—proves on second sight to be an extensive and 
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extended attempt at a coherent defense of individual agency.  He would never quite 
abandon re-statements of individual efficacy, but it is no minor matter that his work after 
1900 took a substantially different direction. 
There is no doubt that, throughout the period from 1870 to 1900,  James 
construed the individual in various and complex ways.  This ambiguity, in fact, does 
much to account for the neat division of his career into distinct segments, each of which 
was signaled by a putative crisis.  These apparently contradictory senses of the 
individual, however, reflect what William Gavin identifies as the “fragility” of the 
Jamesian self.  In James’s mind, the individual is always having to make choices that are 
“‘forced, living, and momentous’” (Gavin 129-30).  These choices may well destroy the 
individual, but made rightly, they may as well cumulatively add to the sum of an 
individual’s worth.  It is these possible outcomes (but especially an anxiety of the former) 
that provide a consistent tenor and rhetorical tone to James’s early work, and that allow 
recognition of a continuous strand through his texts of this time despite his abundant 
diversity of interests.1  As Gavin states, though without identifying chronology, “James’s 
activity changes from ‘existential’ to ‘textual,’ that is, [from searching for the conditions 
of effective action] to writing as protest against inevitability” (130).  The consistent 
urgency with which James defended the importance and ultimate efficacy of individual 
action during the first thirty years of his professional career suggests that this time marks 
                                                 
1 Karen Halttunen argues persuasively that this fragility of the Jamesian self is 
fictively expressed in his brother’s “The Turn of the Screw” (479). 
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the period of his “existential” or “active,” as opposed to “textual,” interest in the 
individual. 
At rare moments, but most visibly in James’s journal entries of the 1870s, the 
individual simply appears to foreshadow the agent who exercises the will to believe.  
This strategy partly derived from James’s sublimated anxiety that the totality of 
experience might not after all provide “sufficient grounds for belief.”  His concern on this 
point would lead directly to his philosophical attempts to identify the foundation which 
would secure meaning and would ultimately result in his fallback onto a position of faith 
(Radical Reconstruction 28-9), but at first the free choice to repudiate nihilism seems to 
have simply been the motivating force that propelled James into a life of investigation.2 
More effectively, and at greater length especially in his early works, James 
celebrated the findings of Darwin as a vindication of individuality.  He often and well 
employed the British naturalist against those who had already applied the theory of 
                                                 
2 Ross Posnock argues that James’s apologia for the individual constitutes “an 
anxious retreat from the modern industrial order” (109).  While James clearly distrusted 
much of the “modern” world, including its nationalistic jingoism and its mechanistic 
attitudes, his critical examination of “The Sentiment of Rationality” and his vigorous 
protest against the Spanish-American War evince little of what has come to be called an 
“anxiety of the individual.”  James, as will be seen, was very much a product of his time, 
but, as Seigfried suggests, his concerns seem more to have emerged from his 
investigations into the implications of his own philosophical positions than from some 
more vague “spirit of the times.”  
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evolution in unwarranted ways (112).  James’s earliest forays into philosophy, “The 
Sentiment of Rationality” (1879) and “Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environment” 
(1880), are undisguised assaults on the frame of mind that leads to Spencerian social 
evolution.  Another essay, again using the title “The Sentiment of Rationality” and 
published in The Will to Believe (1897), in fact expanded on the 1879 article and made 
explicit the connection between the effective action of individuals and the tyrannical 
passion for rational explanation.3 
Finally, James daily confronted and daily attempted to ignore the threat posed to 
his faith in the individual by the spectacular failures of his brother, Garth Wilkinson, who 
had been first a war hero, then an unsuccessful land speculator, and at last an 
undistinguished accountant-partner in an engineering firm.  Much as a more resolute 
Lambert Strether might have, Garth had died in 1883 under a cloud of familial 
disapproval as much for making a bad “match” as for his demonstrated economic 
ineptitude.  As with his proclivity for belief, William James was only dimly aware of how 
                                                 
3 The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (1897) is a 
veritable gold-mine for any topic concerning the individual in James.  Since I am here 
attempting to show that a common concern runs throughout the first thirty years of his 
professional career, the examples that I have selected at least as well as those I have 
overlooked (which, in The Will to Believe, includes such provocatively titled works as 
“The Importance of Individuals” and “Is Life Worth Living?” and the revised and re-
titled “Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environment”) serve to show the continuity of 
James’s thought during these years.   
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much of a dilemma Garth represented to his own philosophy of the individual.4  His 
letters to his brother are usually curt and always superficial, although in correspondence 
with other family members, William more readily expresses the complex association of 
feelings Garth evoked, including admiration, envy, and scorn. 
In one especially remarkable public instance, however, James confronted the self-
destructive impulse that seemed undeniably present in his brother and at times in 
humanity as a whole.  This tendency perpetually mystified the public intellectual from 
Harvard and always brought into sharp question his own existential requirement that 
individual action continue to possess some morally meaningful purpose.  At the 1897 
dedication of the Augustus St. Gaudens’ monument to the truly heroic but fatally 
conceived attack of the 54th Massachusetts Regiment on Battery Wagner, South Carolina 
in 1863, in which Garth had been critically wounded, James was simultaneously able, 
first, to lay uneasily to rest his brother’s unsuccessful (and, so cosmologically 
inconsequential) life and, second, to forge a place in his own scheme of things for the 
massive failure and the utterly insignificant act by filtering his brother and those like him 
through the idealized figure of Robert Gould Shaw.   James took the opportunity to use 
the historical facts of the assault to raise on a larger scale the moral and social quandaries 
that Garth had represented.  He was even able to advance some part of Garth’s memory 
in the guise of the regiment as a monument to greatness, though this move could not be 
                                                 
4 It is impossible to read either William or Henry James for long without being 
struck by their apparent inability to long engage in personally self-reflective thought. 
William James and His Individual Crisis  7 
made without some trepidation, primarily because of the passivism that James developed 
during the war-years. 
Within the context of this period of James’s own life, it is important to note that 
the months immediately preceding the address at the St. Gaudens’ memorial had been 
momentous ones.  In 1890, he had published the long-delayed The Principles of 
Psychology.  More recently and more regularly since 1895, he had been leaving behind 
his empirical investigations of the phenomenological individual that had prompted his 
course in psychology and had instead been developing the pragmatic implications of his 
theory (Radical Reconstruction 12).  In addition, the publication of The Will to Believe in 
the same year as the dedication of the monument to the 54th Massachusetts, provided a 
mature and full expression to his early confident assertions of individual agency. The 
complementary versions of “The Sentiment of Rationality” evince a completion of the 
thought that was barely formed in 1879.  The uncharacteristic “Robert Gould Shaw” and 
the previously published apologies for the individual thus can feasibly be read as two 
aspects of one phenomenon.  The 1897 speech is the private James more publicly 
epitomized in The Principles and The Will to Believe, but the effect of both is the same:  
to announce an end to one stage of James’s pilgrimage, and to herald another.  The 
modern James, concentrating on the crisis of the individual, was being eclipsed by 
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another, post-modern James who was (at least consciously) more intrigued by chaos and 
all of its possibilities than by positivism and its consequences.5 
 
II.  The Vastations of the Father 
The depression suffered by William James in 1870 is so obvious a fact of his life 
that, like the self-evident everywhere, the unique manifestations of the agony he suffered 
are easily obscured beneath the summary diagnosis which contains them.  Perry’s breezy 
assertion that James’s difficulties were “pathological” in origin is not inaccurate, but it is 
misleading to the extent that it encourages overlooking the moral philosophical issues 
with which James was grappling.  Certainly, it is noteworthy that James should have been 
among the first moderns afflicted with one of the common diseases of modernism, but 
what is more striking is that his descent into darkness was provoked by the question of 
whether or not the individual human possessed worth in a morally blind universe.  The 
recurrence of this topic throughout the first months of 1870 presents a credible reason for 
suggesting that philosophy proved the reason for as well as the restorative to James’s 
“soul-sickness” (Perry 1:  323-24). 
In order to place the events of 1870 in their properly expanded perspective, it is 
necessary to note among other things (and without questioning the sincerity of James) 
that he was very much the son of a father who had experienced a similar, but far more 
                                                 
5 For more on James’s theory of relations, see Seigfried’s study, Chaos and 
Context:  A Study in William James (1978), and the Winterthur Seminar essays edited 
and collected by Walter Corti in  The Philosophy of William James (1976).  
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devastating period of depression.  Although Henry, Senior, subsequently referred to his 
incapacitating horror at Windsor in 1844 as a Swedenborgian “vastation,” his terrified 
paralysis is religious only in the sense that it assumes the metaphorical cloak of 
depravity.  In contrast with William, what is notable of his Father’s experience is that the 
left hand of darkness seems still ready to tighten its grip even thirty-five years later when 
Henry recalls the moment.  One glorious May, he was suddenly and inexplicably struck 
“by a perfectly insane and abject terror.”  It was as if, he remembered, there were “some 
damnèd shape squatting invisible to me within the precincts of the room, and raying out 
from his fetid personality influences fatal to life” (McDermott 3). 
Clearly, James inherited from his father a tendency toward what was still at that 
time referred to as “melancholia,” and it is as clearly impossible, therefore, to describe 
the subsequent depression of the son entirely in terms of mimicry.  The jottings of James 
during the crucial months of 1870, however, reveal little incapacitation of the sort 
suffered by his father.  These tantalizing passages little more reflect a “desperate 
neurasthenic condition” (Perry 1:  322).  They are apparently, rather, the expressions of a 
deeply felt philosophical condition and in this they echo the intensely personalized 
rhetoric of Henry, Senior more than they do his mental agony.  Henry had established the 
model for his son by employing his private vastation as exemplary of social history in 
“Socialism and Civilization” (Lewis 61).  In a more immediate, but not dissimilar 
fashion, William examines the personal consequences of prevailing philosophical and 
social themes in his diary entries of 1870.  Later, in The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, he would creatively revise his experience in precisely the same manner as his 
father (Perry 1:  322). 
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On February 1, 1870, James simply recorded that on that same day he had “about 
touched bottom,” but even at this date the cause of his despair was patently 
philosophical:  “shall I frankly throw the moral business overboard,” or “shall I follow it” 
for its own sake, rejecting moral behavior derived from “utilitarian ends” (1: 322).  The 
young, rather directionless graduate was groping toward formulating a response to the 
philosophical nihilism then particularly prevalent among his generation, as Turgenev, 
Nietzsche, and Dostoevsky in other countries demonstrated (Radical Reconstruction 28).  
In a loose leafed entry that seems to date from the same period as the February entry, 
James more succinctly than they expressed the root of all this nihilistic despair.  Is it 
possible, James demanded of the cosmos, “so to sympathize with the total process of the 
universe as to heartily assent to the evil that seems inherent in its details” (Perry 1:  322; 
emphasis added)? 
Here, as throughout this major phase of his life, James concludes that if a man—
and the characteristics that contribute to successful individual agency are always very 
male traits for James—is to lead a moral life, then the answer to this question is critical.  
Only when an individual has “vigor of will enough to look the universal death in the face 
without blinking” can he resist “the brute force” of the cosmos.  The ‘vigorous will’ that 
makes effective resistance to the brutal process of the universe possible is recast two 
months later as Renouvier’s “free will” whereby the individual makes an ‘existential 
choice’ for one manner of acting over another (1:  323).  This last formulation will mutate 
and yet remain constantly identifiable throughout James’s texts and will reach its fullest 
expression in the will to believe.  What was likely more critical to James at this point was 
that free will served as the instrument first conceived in February.  With it, he broke the 
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chain of reasoning which held that the “total process of the universe” entailed not only 
evil but blind disregard.  Free will is thus a vigorous denial of the proposition that such a 
process negates the moral value of individual action and the events of April confirmed 
those of February, even if they did not bring an end to them.  In the intervening month, 
James’s thought had moved forward naturally although of course not equably.  As H. S. 
Thayer remarks, the diary entries of the 1870s might not reflect the substance of 
pragmatism, but they do disclose its “central motives and circumstances in . . . [its] 
making” (134).  Still it is clear that if James had reached some sort of resolution (and he 
had), the answers were only contingent and far from proving themselves philosophically 
viable.  
 
III.  The Sentiment of Great Men  
James’s first publications evince a desire to share the insight he had achieved with 
a like minded audience, but  before he could do this he had to respond to what he saw as 
its most philosophically dangerous alternative:  the evolutionary philosophy of Herbert 
Spencer.  For this reason, James’s first texts are explicitly polemical and forthrightly 
aimed at different aspects of Spencer’s thought.  As early as 1878, James had taken 
Spencer to task in a ponderously but accurately entitled essay, “Remarks on Spencer’s 
Definition of Mind as Correspondence.”  In this article which had appeared in the 
January issue of  the Journal of Speculative Philosophy, James showed that Spencer’s 
materialist definition of mental activity did not and could not explain the “‘entire process 
of mental evolution’” (“Remarks” 8).  Any accurate account of evolution would include a 
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description of how we developed the ability to form judgments as well as one of how we 
perfected the skill of discrimination.   
James’s demonstration of this fact either did not satisfy him, or he concluded that 
it would not satisfy his audience, because in subsequent crucial works during the period 
1878-1897, James returned to expand upon his initial criticism.  In the 1879 “The 
Sentiment of Rationality,” he argued that the simplicity in Spencer’s thought that led to 
his correspondence theory of mental activity reflected a broader and not uncommon 
philosophical condition.  In the wider-issued “Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the 
Environment,” James continued his objection to Spencer’s unwarranted simplification 
and argued for the contrary position:  that Darwinian theory emphasized not a mechanism 
which drove species development but the accidental and distinctly individual variation 
which then found a favorable place in the environment. 
“The Sentiment of Rationality” that appeared in the July 1879 issue of Mind is a 
thorough if not wholly satisfying proof that the magisterial labor of philosophy, whether 
on the grand, unifying scale of metaphysics or the finely detailed level of empiricism, 
depends on other than rational foundations.  An effective presentation of this argument 
would allow James to subsequently show that the philosophical account was not 
necessarily definitive and final.  The demonstration undertaken by James turned on the 
single initial premise that philosophical rationality constituted a quest for a ruling 
“conception” or “teleological instrument” (“Sentiment of Rationality” [1879] 319).   
If this proposition was valid, the history of philosophy could be written as a 
straightforward attempt to find the “right” guiding conceptions.  To this end, philosophy 
was also motivated by and driven to answers that reduced “the manifold to simple form” 
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(320).  As Spencer had in the previous article, in this text he provided the typical example 
of where such a reductive mania could lead.  It is suggestive of James’s rapid 
philosophical progress that by this time, Hegel’s rejection of the “principle of 
contradiction” is also employed as another instance of the sentiment of rationality, but 
Spencer remains the primary target of his argument. 
Alongside the reductivist drive which constitutes the main topic of this essay, 
James recognized a contending, “sister passion which in some minds—though they 
perhaps form the minority—is its rival.  This is the passion for distinguishing; it is the 
impulse to be acquainted with the parts rather than to comprehend the whole” (322).  The 
empirical interest in distinctions and analysis would draw more thorough criticism from 
James not too much later in his life.  At this point, the dissecting mind served as much to 
indicate how the desire for simplicity must conveniently ignore a multitude of data in 
order to achieve its end.   
Broadly understood, these sentiments together represented “the two great 
aesthetic needs of our logical nature, the need of unity and the need of clearness” (325).  
Philosophy, James vaguely hoped, would learn to balance these two needs.  The pleas for 
compromise interspersed throughout this work mark it as the product of a still relatively 
inexperienced if not naïve philosopher,  but there would never be any doubt in his own 
mind of the fundamental soundness of the guiding assumption.  Philosophy’s historical 
tendency toward simplification could only benefit from attending now and then to the 
pluralism of life rather than the monism of existence. 
Empiricists could not deny (and James placed himself at this date in his life 
among the heirs of Hume) that necessary truths possessed an inward reasonableness that 
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discrete sensory phenomena do not.  The “association” of “outward” appearance was 
“custom-bred,” just as Hume said (327).  The “identification” of data as possessing of 
predicational attributes, however, itself exhibited the passion for simplification.  As an 
example, James produced the seeming evolutionary definition of all parts of a flower as 
“modified leaves.”  This description he showed to be the finally mathematical, and 
therefore necessarily true, but not very effectual classification of a flower’s parts as “later 
appendages of the axis” (328).   
If an attributional identification of a sensory phenomena was to be other than 
tautological, therefore, it must serve some “practical” end.  This further move was 
allowed by James’s contention that science proceeds by identifying certain classes with 
previously recognized associations of phenomena (329).  When we have identified some 
being as, ‘tool-making,’ for instance, then we can conclude that all such beings display 
an ability to choose.  James himself did not supply this step in his reasoning, but it is 
implicit in the example he chooses of prisms as distorting media which refract light 
toward the perpendicular. 
What James provided in either case is the last move which allows us to sketch in 
even at this point his entire rational activity loop which he will announce in the second 
“Sentiment of Rationality.”  An act may be called rational if it consists of a theory which 
produces some practice of association which results in an effective, i.e., further 
productive, action.  Darwin’s theory is thereby warranted in that it provides its own 
pragmatic consequences.  Spencer, in now pointed contrast, fails to move beyond the 
tautological phase of identification when he reduces sensation to a record on a “mental 
molecule” (336). 
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Social evolution, it becomes obvious, will not lead to any further systematic 
practice nor will it produce effective action leading to new associations.  At best, it 
allows a “limited process” of reasoning.  If useful at all, the philosophy of Spencer is 
worth advancing as one of the first instances how the desire for rationality can end in 
unwarranted assertions.  If Spencer’s work epitomizes some more positive fact, it is that 
“the reduction of the phenomenal Chaos to rational form must stop at a certain point” 
(337).  That schwerpunkt in the mind of James will always be the moment at which 
practice bears its most vital fruit. 
James followed up on this conclusion in the next year with the publication of 
“Great Men, Great Thoughts and the Environment.”  Darwinian thought, James showed 
Spencer in this article from the popular Atlantic Monthly, was far from making the 
individual an insignificant datum within a scientific theory.  Rather, Darwin presupposed 
the criticality of the individual variation which attracted scientific attention precisely 
because it did not fit what had come before.  This essay prefigures the future shape of 
Jamesian philosophy with its emphasis on scientific theory as indeterminate in its 
findings.  It much more clearly reflects James’s dominant interest of the moment. 
The discovery of individual efficacy which had precipitated James’s emergence 
from his initial depression was here granted scientific status.  This argument had the dual 
value of at once countering Spencer’s philosophy and simultaneously offering an 
instance of how causal relationships are key in our understanding of experience.  The 
latter subject would again provide the basis for James’s metaphysics of relations that 
continues to tantalize philosophers in its anticipation of contemporary thought (Chaos 
and Context 6), but James was more specifically concerned at this juncture with 
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accounting for how failure to recognize this same phenomena formed the basis of 
Spencerian philosophy.  If James could at least describe how great societies could not 
develop without great men, then he had sufficient grounds to dispute the mechanistic 
models put forth by thinkers such as Spencer. 
Otto von Bismarck provided James with startling proof of his thesis, as his 
intellectually impoverished Boston was pressed into service as an equally remarkable 
negative example.  Bismarck was the necessary ingredient added to the German culture 
which allowed it to spring, Athena-like, from the addled head of Europe.  The ferment of 
Boston, meanwhile, was wasted without the individual who, like Bismarck, gave the 
necessary but not sufficient “human material” an effective “form” (“Great Men” 446). 
James, here as elsewhere, displays his own societal limitations.  Beyond question, 
he “identifies” (to use his own term) greatness with the male gender and its 
manifestations.  These traits of masculinity were the same as those which obligated 
James to strenuous displays of his own manhood, such as his trip to Brazil, and which led 
to much of his self-doubt, such as his introspective moods after the wounded Garth was 
brought home (Lewis 148).  It is another indication of his maturing sense of self and of 
the crucial nature of this period in his life that by 1899 he could satirize Teddy 
Roosevelt’s praise of “The Strenuous Life” as so much masculine “crowing” that would 
have terrible cultural consequences (Perry 2:  310). 
At the same time, James’s study of individual greatness remains an accurate 
estimation of Darwin’s theory and method.  His cheerful acceptance of provisional 
knowledge and conviction of  the reality of relations gave him the ability to refute 
Spencer in cogent and experiential ways.  By using Darwin as an alternative case, James 
William James and His Individual Crisis  17 
reveals how Spencer commits the ‘productive fallacy’ in which a scientist attempts to 
describe how a phenomena is produced, a process which leads to the infinite regression 
noted by the ancient philosophers (444).  Darwin’s model, in contrast, describes what 
leads to the preservation of one or more species-specific traits.  Darwin does not study 
what chain of causation produced the ovum; he examines the ways in which it acts in its 
environment (445).   
By the time he wrote the 1897 “The Sentiment of Rationality”—an essay that 
summarized the earlier text of the same name and to which he appended a portion of 
another article, “Rationality, Activity, and Faith”—James could return with confidence to 
his initial subject in order to round out the implications of individual agency.  Without 
any doubt, he had moved beyond contending with Spencer.  In the latter “Sentiment,” 
James barely touched on social evolution; he posited instead that the sentiment of repose, 
rest, or peace which motivates rationality also possessed a moral and practical dimension. 
Practically, this sentiment serves an evolutionary end, much as an environment 
requires the presence of significant individuals in order for evolution to proceed.  In the 
same fashion, our passion for certainty evinces an early necessity that we “banish 
uncertainty” by making methodic choices (“The Sentiment of Rationality” [1897]  68).  
Our deep-seated biological requirement to make distinctions implies simplification on a 
rational order, but the same need is integrated into investigation in ways only intimated in 
the 1879 “Sentiment.” 
This experimental method will become part and parcel of pragmatism, but it is 
nowhere more evident than at this point in the later essay that pragmatism cannot easily 
be examined in isolation as a method of investigation or as a way of talking about 
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meaning or truth.  In moral terms made explicit by James in this article, the practical and 
methodological organization of experience into distinct events makes empirical 
explanation in particular and rational in thought in general subject to intersubjective 
agreement.  What a community of investigators agree to, after all, is that they reach 
common conclusions by means of the same conceptual instrument.  In Pragmatism, 
James will emphasize by means of this proposition how we habitually cling to our current 
truths and so perforce make new phenomenal facts “compatible with ‘the whole body of 
other truths already in our possession’” (Thayer 149).  In 1897, it leads him to the more 
immediate observation that the sentiment of rationality is in part aesthetic, as our 
preference for one explanation when faced with two equally acceptable accounts 
demonstrates (“The Sentiment of Rationality” [1897] 66).  
Due to this quality of subjective interest which dictates intersubjective 
concurrence, the individual can plainly and easily wreck any rational system by bluntly 
denying its ruling aesthetic passion, whether it be for simplification or complexity.  
Surprisingly, at this juncture where the individual attains her greatest significance, James 
reduces that impact to its most concise form in a tantalizing display of rationality’s 
method.  By this formulation, the rational explanation or, more broadly, the “the total 
matter of philosophic propositions” (“M”) is never complete unless it includes the ability 
to infinitely add individual agents (“x”) to the sum of such knowledge.  The solution to 
the philosophic equation of “M + x,” then, is that philosophy must at least potentially 
comprehend its own negation in the manner of Arnold’s “Aberglaube” or “but-belief” 
(75) or, in Jamesian terms of the individual, by comprehending the personal albeit 
“infinitesimal . . . component” (81). 
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This insight is what allows James to begin his renovation of the philosophical 
house.  James side-steps the “schools” of idealism and materialism by nullifying their key 
claims.  He shows how all philosophical traditions (or world views) that preach an 
absolute reality are not at the very last oppressive or even terribly evil.  They are, rather, 
“indeterminate, susceptible of forming part of a thoroughgoing pessimism on the one 
hand, or of a meliorism, a moral (as distinguished from a sensual) optimism on the other.  
All depends on the character of the personal contribution ‘x’” (84; emphasis added).  By 
emphasizing this critical contribution of “x” to “experience,” James evades both the 
paradoxes of (1) determinism and (2) positivist science.  If experience really is 
encountered as an intermediate phenomena, as James’s early friend, C. S. Peirce, 
particularly noted, then it matters not whether “M + x” is fixed or free:  it is whichever 
we choose.   Simultaneously, the equation rejects the notion that truth equates to its 
manner of experimental verification as even early positivists such as Peirce had held.  
James asserts, rather, that any individual “belief [even an aberglaube] creates its [own] 
verification” (84).    
There is, as a consequence, no last goal toward which human inquiry tends, and 
there can therefore be no final word on the importance of the individual in an ostensibly 
evolutionary process.  Individuals do not deduce from some hypothesis “an experimental 
action ‘x’” which is added to the “facts ‘M’ already existing.”  Rather, they “corroborate” 
some action with some experiment (that is, they conduct experimentation because of 
some desire).  If this corroborative element is attended to at all, it will follow that a 
“theory will be reversed by nothing that later turns up as . . . action’s fruit” (86).  If we 
may act in any way, we may at will refute all the truths marshaled against us. 
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The obvious result is threefold.  First, we need never fear the deadening 
"anesthesia” of any absolute or any totality.  No external world will cause or “justify a 
conclusion in advance of my action.”  The “evidence will not be ‘in’” until the “last man 
has had his say and contributed his share” (87).  Second, we are never in a position from 
which we may trumpet a truth.  Our own realities are, at least in part, uniquely possessed 
and professed.  Our truths are necessarily fallible, to use Peircean terms.  Still, insofar as 
addition is an infinite process by which new sums are eternally created we have not only 
a right, but a duty according to James to join a swelling chorus of human affirmation.  
Third, rational explanations of whatever type, but especially scientific ones, must find 
immediately experiential ways of justifying themselves. 
Rather than humanity adapting to reason, in sum, reason must respond to human 
life and take into account its own provisional nature.   Explanatory systems are what they 
are:  reflections of a biological compulsion.  Moreover, reason can only progress beyond 
this base level of brute fact by the application of experimental ends which serve clear 
purposes.  With these recognitions, James was ready to follow the two strands of his 
nascent philosophy into pluralism and radical empiricism.  He had more generally, if 
quietly, announced the end of his philosophical apprenticeship and his readiness to move 
beyond the isolated individual as a discrete subject of investigation.    
  
IV. The Cash Value of Failure 
Before he moved on to other fields, James said a last goodbye to the occupations 
of his youth in the memorial speech, “Robert Gould Shaw.”  In this too infrequently 
studied address, he reiterated his not inappreciable insights of the preceding thirty years 
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and introduced one of the clear statements of moral philosophy that are rare enough in 
James’s corpus to have provoked from Abraham Edel the observation that James always 
leaves us with “much less [of a moral philosophy] than we need or hope” (Corti 245).  
Although Edel’s focus is on the exceptional discussion of the subject in “The Moral 
Philosophy and the Moral Life” (an essay again contained in The Will to Believe), the 
same motif of moral existence is ostensible in the posthumously published “Robert Gould 
Shaw.”  In the latter text, however, James calibrated his moral philosophical instrument 
by means of the same questions that had preoccupied him in 1870.  Of what worth is it, 
he asked in both cases, if  people cast their experiential lots with their moral lives only to 
have that choice nullified by other events? 
“Robert Gould Shaw” is especially important, too, because the occasion of the 
memorialization of the 54th Massachusetts would have compelled William to confront the 
most vivid exception possible to his faith in the efficacy of individual action.  William 
had proven his rhetorical point well in the various versions of “The Sentiment of 
Rationality” and “Great Men,” but in very personal ways the spectacular failure of his 
brother in business and his apparent poor “match” threatened to invalidate both Garth’s 
courage at Battery Wagner and William’s own boundless confidence in the individual.  
The dedication, in short, allowed William to find a place for failure on an epic as well as 
personal scale in his evolutionary cosmology.  At the unveiling of St. Gaudens memorial, 
James put what Henry would call the “dead past” to a final rest.   
William achieved this remarkable resolution by recasting the fact of unrealized 
possibility as a differently valued (and differently figured) version of experience.  The 
measure of success was not, he asserted, military or cultural or personal accomplishment.  
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It was not even evaluated by “historical significance . . . [,] material magnitude, nor by its 
immediate success” (“Robert Gould Shaw” 39).  Instead, at least one warranted measure 
of moral value was the degree to which an individual act bears “witness to the 
brotherhood of man” (54). 
By this measure of quiet heroism—James praised the memorial as the first 
“soldier’s” monument to “comparatively undistinguished men” (42)—the largely 
inconsequential life of his brother gained a resounding worth.  As crucially, William’s 
passivism and therefore his own practical inconsequentiality during the struggle were 
granted a fortuitous credence.  By this light, the war was a cultural tragedy that could 
have been averted.  Even the eventual success of the union cause was no final cause for 
celebration.  “Democracy,” James warned, “is still upon its trial” (60).  The individual 
act, in other words, gains moral credence by its democratic intent rather than its effect.   
That James employed the figure of Robert Gould Shaw in this context, as an 
example of the value of a failed but still morally meaningful action, is demonstrated by 
his decision to eschew historical rules by which the bravery of Shaw and his regiment 
could be measured (39).  Not only was their assault on Battery Wagner a tactical defeat, 
it should never have been required in the first place.  If James was to make his point to 
any more than the immediate acquaintances of Shaw, however, the situation of the 
Commander of the 54th must be made to exemplify all who had found themselves 
similarly situated (such as Garth and the valiant soldiers Shaw commanded, as well as the 
less conspicuous heroes such as William) in the belated struggle for an expanded 
democracy.     
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In his address, then, James consistently and clearly used Shaw as an exemplary 
and even allegorized soldier. The romanticized description of Shaw could as easily be 
that of his own brother, as James imagines Shaw sitting “on horseback . . . , the blue-eyed 
child of fortune, upon whose happy youth every divinity had smiled” (40).  Shaw, like 
Garth and William and Henry and the even more tragic brother, Robert, was obviously 
born with a moral duty to perform. 
But the figure of Shaw stood as a sign to other than the distinctly privileged:  
“What Shaw and his comrades represented was that in such an emergency Americans of 
all complexions and conditions could go forth like brothers” in order to insure that faith 
in democratic efforts “shall not become a failure on earth” (43).  As a broader image of 
moral value, Shaw was an example “for all time, an inciter to similarly unselfish public 
deeds” (44).  James did not wish to strip the 54th of its valor, but he did wish to 
distinguish “the moral service” of their act “from the fortitude” they displayed, and so, as 
he concluded his address, he directed his audience to examine the actions of their friends 
and of themselves in the light of what Shaw had shown.  “You,” he directed them, “think 
of many as I speak of one” (59).  By this means, they could evaluate the moral worth of 
their own lives and deeds even through the lens of those who had been overwhelmed by 
circumstance. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
Because James displayed such continuity and consistency in his thought during 
the years 1870-1897, it should come as no surprise that he would now and then return to 
the same issues.  As previously observed, however, the individual as such ceased to be a 
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significant subject in its own right after 1900.  It is instructive to note in closing, 
therefore, some of the ways in which the individual was recast in his later work. 
In Essays in Radical Empiricism (posthumously published in 1912), for instance, 
James glanced back at his work on The Principles.  His early endeavors, he observed in a 
footnote of the later text, had opposed the individual to the environment in an attempt to 
examine how an “activity deserved the name of ‘ours’” (170).  He could have made the 
same point of most of his investigations prior to 1900, including “The Sentiment of 
Rationality” and “Great Men” and “Robert Gould Shaw,” for the same dualistic 
presumption underwrote these.  In all of them, the individual was similarly and pointedly 
distinguished from the surrounding situation. 
By contrast, Radical Empiricism placed the individual within a larger, 
perspectival framework.  Here, there was no neat division between the “self” and the 
“world.”  Instead, the individual was “the storm centre, the origin of co-ordinates, the 
constant place of stress” already within a preexistent, but effectively neutral, environment 
where the “word ‘I’ . . . is primarily a noun of position, just like ‘this’ and ‘here’” (170). 
It is important to recognize that James did not surrender in later life any of the 
individual empowerment he had so painfully achieved.  He saw “no inconsistency 
whatever in defending, on the one hand, ‘my’ activities as unique and opposed to those of 
outer nature” and, on the other, of examining the individual in situ rather than in isolation 
(171).  What his new investigations were leading him to, rather, was the insight that our 
environment is made at least as much as it is given.  He was leaving behind the ostensibly 
“modern” world into which he had been born, where the individual had been engaged in 
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a struggle for existence.  He was now fashioning a new and more integrated sense of self 
which suggested a negotiated existence, rather than a combative one.   
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